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NOTE 
Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited 
Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
Benjamin Means 
"Nobody is trying to do anything here except to keep pothunters from 
killing game out of season . . . .  "1 
INTRODUCTION 
Dissatisfied with the protection afforded wildlife by more recent 
environmental laws, some environmentalists seek to reinterpret one 
of the oldest federal environmental laws, the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act (MBTA).2 Long understood simply to regulate hunting,3 the 
MBTA makes it illegal to "take" or "kill" migratory birds without a 
permit.4 The MBTA imposes strict liability for a violation.5 
1. 55 CoNG. R:Ec. 4816 (1917) (statement of Sen. Smith). 
2. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994) (original version at ch. 128, 40 
Stat. 755 (1918)). For legal scholarship advocating a broad interpretation of the MBTA, see 
George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Mi­
gratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. CoLO. L. R:Ev. 165 (1979); Erin C. Perkins, Co=ent, Migra­
tory Birds and Multiple-Use Management: Using the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Rejuvenate 
America's National Environmental Policy, 92 Nw. U. L. R:Ev. 817 (1998); Craig D. Sjostrom, 
Comment, Of Birds and Men: The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 26 IDAHo L. R:Ev. 371 (1989). 
3. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559 ( S.D. Ind. 1996). In con­
cluding that habitat modification does not fall within the ambit of the MBTA, the court noted 
the complete absence of any such prosecutions in the MBTA's 80-year history. See 927 F. 
Supp. at 1581. See also Seattle Audubon Socy. v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302-03 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the MBTA concerns "physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and 
poachers"). 
4. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 ("Unless and except as permitted by regulations . .. it shall be 
unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, 
attempt to take, capture, or kill ... any migratory bird .... "). The accompanying regulations 
define a "migratory bird" as "any bird, whatever its origin ... which belongs to a species 
listed in §10.13 .... " 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1997). As discussed infra at note 10, nearly every 
species of bird in North America is now included. 
5. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) ("[A]ny person ... who shall violate any provisions ... shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and ... shall be fined not more than $500 or be imprisoned 
not more than six months, or both."). See also United States v. FM C Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 906 
(2d Cir. 1978) ("[ C]ases involving hunters have consistently held that' ... it is not necessary 
that the government prove that a defendant violated [the MBTA's] provisions with guilty 
knowledge or specific intent to commit the violation."' (quoting Rogers v. United States, 367 
F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966))); United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Ky. 
1939) (finding irrelevant whether defendants knew they were violating the statute). 
Misdemeanor convictions still do not require knowledge, but in 1986 Congress amended 
the MBTA to require that felony violations be committed "knowingly." See 16 U.S.C. 
§ 707(b). A "knowing" violation, however, may not require specific intent to violate the 
statute. The Senate report states that a defendant must be shown merely to know that his 
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A heady combination of strict liability, criminal penalty provi­
sions, and vague language, the MBTA appeals to those seeking to 
control land use activity.6 Some environmentalists advocate an in­
terpretation of the MBTA that, contrary to legislative intent and 80 
years of enforcement practice, would make any activity resulting in 
the death of migratory birds a violation of the MBTA, regardless of 
whether the defendants directed their activity at wildlife.7 This 
Note argues, however, that the MBTA covers only activity that is 
directed at wildlife, and that absent such purposive conduct, no vio­
lation exists. s 
Extending the MBTA's reach beyond activity directed at wild­
life would hamper normal land use activities that often result in 
bird death - such as farming, timber harvesting, and brush clearing 
- because causing the death of almost any bird would amount to a 
violation of the law. Migratory birds include "many of the most 
numerous and least endangered species one can imagine."9 Almost 
all species of North American birds, including crows, grackles, and 
pigeons, are listed by the Interior Department as migratory birds.10 
action amounted to a taking and that the item taken was a bird. See S. REP. No. 99-445, at 16 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128; cf. United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187 
(6th Cir. 1992) (holding that, for a knowing criminal violation of the Clean Water Act, actual 
knowledge of the permit requirement need not be shown). See generally Susan F. 
Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental 
Example, ENVI'L. L. 1165, 1242 (1995) (concluding that it is still uncertain whether the knowl­
edge requirement will substantially alter the government's burden in proving felony viola­
tions of the MBTA). 
6. See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 371 ("The META is a concise statute, written in 
general language flexible enough to be used in situations beyond its original scope. This, 
ironically, places the MBTA at a certain advantage compared to other, more specific environ­
mental statutes." (emphasis added)). For the argument that imprecision in drafting should 
not defeat clearly discernible legislative intent, see generally infra Part I. 
7. See, e.g., Appellants' Reply Brief at 1-4, Newton County Wildlife Assn. v. United 
States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1035 (1998) (No. 96-
3463) [hereinafter Appellants' Reply Brief] (arguing that timber harvesting during nesting 
season violates the MBTA because it causes bird deaths). 
8. This Note does not dispute that the MBTA imposes strict liability. Under strict liabil­
ity, the government can always prosecute conduct that amounts to a violation - hunting 
without a permit, for example - and need not show that the defendants had any idea that 
they were violating the statute. Rather, this Note points out that the inclusion of strict liabil­
ity language in the statute does not answer the question of what amounts to the actus reus of 
a violation. 
9. Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1576 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
10. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 190 ("The MBTA now protects nearly all native 
birds in the country, of which there are millions if not billions, so there is no end to the 
possibilities for an arguable violation."). For a complete listing of protected migratory birds, 
see 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1997). "[I]f • . .  the META prohibits the inadvertently-caused death of 
any migratory bird . . .  land uses on tens of millions of acres would be impaired." T11Dber 
Appellees' Brief at 2, Newton County Wildlife Assn. , 113 F.3d 110 (No. 96-3463) [hereinafter 
T11Dber Appellees' Brief]. 
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No de minimjs exception appears to apply, because the l\1BTA 
makes unlawful the taking of a single migratory bird.11 
Courts disagree about the breadth of the l\1BT A. Some have 
read the l\1BTA broadly and held that it can reach accidental bird 
death.12 The Second Circuit, for example, held that a defendant's 
inadvertent contamination of ground water (which poisoned migra­
tory birds) violated the l\1BT A.13 Recently, other courts have read 
the l\1BTA more narrowly, confining it to the regulation of hunt­
ing.14 The Eighth Circuit, for instance, held that bird death result­
ing from timber harvesting did not violate the l\1BT A because "it 
would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to 
construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such as 
timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of migratory 
birds."15 
This Note argues that the MBTA applies only to activities di­
rected at wildlife. Part I contends that the language and legislative 
history of the statute show that Congress intended a narrow reading 
of the MBTA. Part II demonstrates that, if construed broadly, the 
MBTA would become a criminal law of disturbing breadth, and 
that the limiting principles that have been suggested 
11. See United States v.  Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 529 (E.D. Cal. 1978), atfd., 
578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Looking first at the language of the MBTA itself, it is clear that 
Congress intended to make the unlawful killing of even one bird an offense. "); cf. United 
States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 903 (2d Cir. 1978) (assuming the government's ability to 
bring separate indictments for individual bird deaths, including 24 counts each involving the 
death of a single bird). The Corbin court determined that where a single act results in multi­
ple bird deaths, the principle of lenity requires that only one violation be charged because it 
is unclear whether Congress intended to make each death a separate-violation. See Corbin 
Fann Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 531. Assuming the validity of the court's analysis, however, it is 
still unclear whether separate violations may be charged when the same activity (e.g., timber 
harvesting) is carried out over a number of days. The prospect of a jail sentence makes the 
MBTA non-trivial, regardless of the number of violations charged. 
12. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905-08; Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. 
Ga. 1996), revd. on other grounds, 110 F.3d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir. 1997); Corbin Fann Serv., 
444 F. Supp. at 529, 531-36. The government has also been able to use the threat of criminal 
prosecution to gain settlements. See Stephen Raucher, Co=ent, Raising the Stakes for En­
vironmental Polluters: The Exxon Valdez Criminal Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147, 170-
73 (noting that Exxon pleaded guilty to charges of violating the MBTA and that the strict 
liability provisions of the MBTA make it "a potent tool "). 
13. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 907-08. 
14. See Newton County Wildlife Assn. , 113 F.3d at 115; Curry v. United States Forest 
Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 549 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1573-74. 
15. Newton County Wildlife Assn. , 113 F.3d at 115. Some courts have found that the 
MBTA provides no private right of action, see Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551 {11th Cir. 
1997), or that the government has i=unity from prosecution, see Sierra Club, 110 F.3d at 
1556 ("[T]he MBTA does not apply to the federal government. "); Newton County Wildlife 
Assn., 113 F.3d at 116 (finding as alternative reasoning that the permitting requirement of the 
MBTA does not apply to bird-killing activities of federal agencies). This Note argues for a 
narrow interpretation of the MBTA, but does not address whether the federal government 
must follow the MBTA, nor does this Note argue for or against a private right of 
enforcement. 
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prosecutorial discretion, extra-hazardous materials, and permit 
schemes - all suffer from fatal flaws. Part III argues that sound 
environmental policy for migratory birds can be achieved without 
an expanded reading of the MBTA. 
I. LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
This Part contends that well-accepted principles of statutory in­
terpretation16 require a narrow construction of the MBTA. Section 
I. A argues that the language of the statute and of its accompanying 
regulations covers only activities directed at wildlife. Section LB 
argues that the MBTA's legislative history further demonstrates 
that Congress did not intend the MBTA to reach accidental bird 
deaths. 
A. The Language and Regulations 
Statutory interpretation begins with the language of a statute,17 
and the plain language of the MBTA indicates that Congress meant 
only to regulate activity directed at wildlife. The MBTA specifies 
that, "[u]nless and except as permitted by regulations . . .  it shall be 
unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, 
hunt, take, capture, kill, [or] attempt to take . . .  any migratory bird 
. .. .  "18 Words like "hunt" and "pursue" clearly require conduct 
undertaken with the purpose of harming wildlife, and so the debate 
16. Traditional tools of statutory interpretation are designed to determine legislative in­
tent. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993); NLRB v. United Food & Commer­
cial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) ("On a pure question of statutory 
construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using 'traditional tools 
of statutory construction.' If we can do so, then that interpretation must be given effect, and 
the regulations at issue must be fully consistent with it." (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987))). Unambiguous statutory language determines the scope of a 
statute absent "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary . . .. " Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 240-42 (1989); Johns-Manville Corp. v. 
United States, 855 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that clear evidence of legislative 
intent prevails over other principles of statutory construction). 
17. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 
(1990); Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). 
18. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994). The full list of prohibited conduct is as follows: 
[B]y any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, 
capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, 
purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or 
imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause 
to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory 
bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufac­
tured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, 
or egg thereof, included in the terms of the conventions . .. .  
16 u.s.c. § 703. 
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over the MBTA has largely focused on the meaning of the words 
"take" and "kill."19 
Section I.A.1 concentrates on the words "take" and "kill," the 
statutory language relied upon by the proponents of an expanded 
MBTA, and shows that the words actually support a narrow inter­
pretation of the MBTA. Section I. A.2 demonstrates that the statu­
tory context of "take" and "kill" resolves any lingering ambiguity in 
favor of a narrow interpretation. In particular, section I.A.2 con­
tends that the surrounding statutory language - "pursue," "hunt," 
"capture," "attempt to take" - evinces congressional intent to pro­
hibit only activity directed at wildlife. 
1. Take and Kill 
The ordinary meaning of the word "take," when applied to wild­
life, denotes intentionally reducing the wildlife to possession. Web­
ster's Third New International Dictionary defines "take" as "to get 
into one's hands or into one's possession, power, or control by force 
or stratagem: ... to get possession of (as fish or game) by killing or 
capturing .... "20 This definition makes the intent to possess cen-
tral. When migratory birds die as a consequence of activity not di­
rected at them, as in crop harvesting, no one reduces the birds to 
possession, nor does anyone attempt to possess them. 
The regulatory definition of "take" accompanying the MBTA 
does not contradict the ordinary meaning of the word found in 
Webster's. According to the accompanying regulations, which reca­
pitulate much of the language of the MBTA itself, "[t]ake means to 
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt 
to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect."21 The 
additional action words in the regulation's definition of "take" -
"shoot," "wound," "trap," and "collect" - help confirm that the 
meaning of "take" should be confined to activity directed at wild­
life.22 It does not make sense to say that one "traps" or "collects" 
wildlife accidentally. "Shoot" also seems strongly associated with 
hunting, and "wound," if not restricted to activity directed at wild­
life, would make the MBTA absurdly broad.23 
The MBTA's narrow version of "take" becomes clearer when 
contrasted with the definition of "take" found in the Endangered 
19. See, e.g., Newton County Wildlife Assn., 113 F.3d at 115; Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1573-
74. 
20. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 2329-30 (1986); cf., Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 124 (1904) 
("[L]anguage used in a statute which has a settled and well-known meaning, sanctioned by 
judicial decision, is presumed to be used in that sense . . . .  "). 
21. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1997). 
22. See Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1579. 
23. See infra Part II. 
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Species Act (ESA).24 As defined in the ESA, "'take' means to har­
ass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect 
• • • •  "25 The accompanying regulations define "harm" to "include 
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually 
kills or injures wildlife."26 If Congress had wanted to include simi­
larly broad language in the MBTA, it could have done so. As one 
circuit court observed, that Congress did not add broadening words 
such as "harass" and "harm" to the MBTA shows that the differ­
ence between the two laws is "distinct and purposeful."27 
"Kill" is less a term of art in wildlife law than "take," and its 
scope depends upon statutory context. The dictionary definition 
does not advance the analysis. "Kill," according to Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary, means, "to deprive of life: put to 
death: cause the death of. "28 Whatever its potential scope, in the 
context of the MBTA the better reading of "kill" requires activity 
directed at wildlife. 
The regulations accompanying the MBTA focus exclusively on 
"take" and thereby avoid the potential for ambiguity in "kill." The 
regulations relegate "kill" to the chain of words used to define 
"take,"29 rely solely on the word "take" to describe the permit pro­
cess,30 and never even bother to define "kill." Whatever independ­
ent meaning "kill" might retain in the statute - despite its 
24. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). 
25. 16 u.s.c. § 1532(19). 
26. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore­
gon, 515 U.S. 687, 701 (1995), the Court relied on the definition of "take" provided by the 
ESA and its accompanying regulations to conclude that "take" encompassed habitat modifi­
cation. The Justices interpreted "take" broadly in the context of the ESA, where it is a 
defined term, despite the traditional understanding of "take" which Justice Scalia, dissenting, 
felt should outweigh even the use of the words "harass" and "harm" in the statutory 
definition: 
If "take" were not elsewhere defined in the Act, none could dispute what it means, for 
the term is as old as the law itself. To "take," when applied to wild animals, means to 
reduce those animals, by killing or capturing, to human control. This is just the sense in 
which "take" is used elsewhere in federal legislation and treaty. See, e.g., Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988 ed., Supp. V). 
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations to cases omitted). Scalia's dis­
sent provides helpful explication of the standard meaning of the word "take," notwithstand­
ing the majority's conclusion that the use of "harass" and "harm" in the E SA's statutory 
definition of "take" showed that Congress did not intend to rely on the traditional under­
standing when it enacted the E SA. 
27. Seattle Audubon Socy. v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991). 
28. WEBSTER'S, supra note 20, at 1242. 
29. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (defining "take" as "to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect") 
(emphasis added). 
30. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.11 (general permit requirements); cf. United States v. Atchison, 
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 37, 44 (1911) ("The presence of such a provision in one 
part [of a statute] and its absence in the other is an argument against reading it as implied 
[where omitted]."). 
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subordination to "take" in the regulations 
sharply limits both "kill" and "take." 
2. Context of Take and Kill 
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statutory context 
The statutory context further demonstrates that "take" and 
"kill" refer to purposive conduct. Courts may not ignore the con­
text of statutory language.31 In the MBTA, the words "take" and 
"kill" are in part defined by the words that surround them. Be­
cause all of the words of prohibition in the statute except "take" 
and "kill" exclusively denote activity directed at migratory birds,32 
it would be logical to assume that "take" and "kill" have a similar 
meaning - a logic embodied in the principle of noscitur a sociis. 33 
If a party invitation said, "bring your own beer, whiskey, or·other 
poison," it would be unmistakably clear that "poison" meant an al­
coholic beverage of only normal toxicity. Such is the case here. 
Even though it is possible to read "take" and "kill" in a more ex­
pansive manner, courts may not ignore the language accompanying 
those words and defy the statute's obvious purpose. 
The MBTA's prohibition of attempts34 also suggests that the law 
is aimed at purposive conduct; one cannot unintentionally attempt 
to take a bird. It would strain the statutory language and defy com­
mon sense to assert that one can be guilty of an attempt for any 
activity, that, if completed, would cause the death of migratory 
birds. One hunts birds with the hope and expectation of killing 
them. Hunters then are at least aware that they may violate the 
MBTA if they do not carefully follow hunting regulations.35 
The words "take" and "kill" follow the phrase "by any means or 
in any manner"36 and must be read in conjunction with it. The very 
31. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.134, 142 (1985) (objecting 
to the "divorce [of] the phrase being construed from its context"); Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 
F.3d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir. 1997) ("The MBTA . . .  should be read as a whole to derive its 
plain meaning."). 
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994). The inclusion of prohibitions on selling and transporting 
migratory birds, for example, suggests that the statute is concerned with intentional takings, 
because sales and transport would likely follow an intentional taking. See also Seattle Audu­
bon Socy., 952 F.2d at 302 (remarking that the MBTA "describes physical conduct of the sort 
engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of 
the statute's enactment in 1918"); Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 
1579 (S.D. Ind. 1996) ("The connection between these words and hunting . . .  is apparent."). 
33. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (defining noscitur a sociis: "a 
word is known by the company it keeps" (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 
307 (1961))); see also BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 979 (Baldwin's Cent ed., 1926) ("In the 
construction of laws . . .  general words following an enumeration of specific things are usually 
restricted to things of the same kind . . .  as those specifically enumerated.") (defining the 
related term ejusdem generis). 
34. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 ("attempt to take, capture, or kill"). 
35. Cf. United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Ky. 1939) (finding it irrele­
vant whether or not defendants knew it was an MBTA violation to hunt in a baited field). 
36. 16 u.s.c. § 703. 
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expansiveness of the phrase, however, cuts against a broad reading 
of "take" and "kill." If "take" and "kill" include any activity that 
results in bird death, despite lack of purpose, then "by any means or 
in any manner" operates to ban ordinary activities to the point of 
absurdity. Even if the plain meaning of the statute suggested such 
breadth, it would not control.37 
Moreover, the broad interpretation would criminalize certain 
everyday behavior, and the Supreme Court recognizes a strong pre­
sumption against criminalizing ordinary activities. In United States 
v. X-Citement Video, 38 for example, the Supreme Court indicated 
that it would refuse to make a drugstore owner criminally liable 
merely for developing film, even if the film happened to contain 
images of children engaged in sex acts. 39 The Court reached that 
conclusion despite statutory language most naturally read to in­
clude drugstore owners and despite the absence of legislative his­
tory on point.40 A broad interpretation of the MBTA would make 
possible prosecution for farming, timber harvesting, brush clearing, 
and window installation. The mere possibility of criminal liability 
for such ordinary behavior is untenable. If, on the other hand, 
"take" and "kill" require activity directed at migratory birds, then 
"by any means or in any manner" refers merely to the myriad ways 
people might devise to hunt birds.41 
B. The Legislative History 
Even if we were beguiled by possible ambiguity and thought 
that the MBTA's plain meaning seemed to require a broad inter­
pretation of the statute's scope, we might still wonder whether Con­
gress could be supposed to have passed a statute so expansive. We 
need not speculate; the legislative history of the MBTA makes per-
37. See, e.g., Perry v. Co=erce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (quoting United 
States v. American Trucking Assn., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)). The Court explained: 
"There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the 
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these 
words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In 
such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd 
or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the 
act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results 
but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a 
whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words." 
38. 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 
39. See 513 U.S. at 69. 
40. See 513 U.S. at 69 ("We do not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended such 
results." (citing Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-55 (1989))); see 
also Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286 (1982) (holding that a statute that prohibited 
the making of false statements to a bank did not apply to the deposit of a "bad check" 
because "the Government's interpretation . . . would make a surprisingly broad range of 
unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law"). 
41. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1579-80 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
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fectly plain that the MBTA was passed solely to restrict activity di­
rected at wildlife. 
Enacted as a wartime measure in 1918, the MBTA regulates 
hunting for pragmatic reasons. Congress enacted the MBTA as "a 
food-conservation measure."42 The Senator who introduced the bill 
observed, "[t]his law is aimed at the professional pothunter"43 and 
"[n]obody is trying to do anything here except to keep pothunters 
from killing game out of season."44 The sponsoring Senator ex­
plained further that "[e]nough birds will keep every insect off of 
every tree in America, and if you will quit shooting them they will 
do it."45 By reducing the insect population, migratory birds would 
protect crops and ensure a steady supply of food to sustain the war 
effort.46 Others who supported the bill shared the sponsoring Sena­
tor's sense of pragmatism. In a letter read into the Congressional 
Record, the National Association of Game and Fish Commissioners 
urged the passage of the law as a war measure to maximize food 
production.4 7 An interpretation of the MBTA that impedes the or­
dinary land use activity associated with food production would 
thwart congressional intent. 
In the wake of court decisions finding earlier laws designed to 
regulate bird hunting unconstitutional,48 it seems highly unlikely 
42. 55 CONG. REc. 4400 (1917) (statement of Sen. McLean). 
43. 55 CONG. REc. 4402 (statement of Sen. Smith). 
44. 55 CONG. REc. 4816 (statement of Sen. Smith). 
45. 55 CoNG. REc. 4816 (statement of Sen. Smith). See also Senator Stedman's grandilo-
quent phrasing of the same idea: 
[L]et the boll weevil go to rest amidst the happy hunting grounds of his fathers in that 
great and splendid region of our land where he first saw the light. Let his onward march 
of destruction be halted forever, and few there will be, even where the doctrine of State 
rights is most highly cherished, who will lament his departure or criticize those who have 
hastened his funeral obsequies, as is intended by this act, and may his allies of the same 
vicious type likewise share his fate. Let the song bird live to herald to the world its 
happy and joyous anthem proclaiming the goodness of God to all his creatures. 
56 CoNG. REc. 7362 (1918). 
46. See 56 CoNG. REc. 7362 (statement of Sen. Stedman) ("Save the birds which destroy 
the insects and an incalculable service will be rendered to our country by increasing its supply 
of food so imperatively needed to meet the necessities of the war in which we are now en­
gaged and to the successful issue of which we have pledged our fortunes, our lives, and our 
honor .... "). 
47. See 55 CoNG. REc. 4816 ("'Whereas the conservation and protection of the migratory 
insectivorous birds is so closely related to the conservation of the food, cotton, and timber 
crops of the country, and the migratory game birds constitute an important source of the 
food supply . . .. [T]he said bill is, and should be, considered an important war measure .... "' 
(quoting June 13, 1917, resolution of the National Association of Game and Fish 
Commissioners)). 
48. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 295-96 ( D. Kan. 1915) (holding that each 
state has a plenary power over the wildlife within its borders); United States v. Shauver, 214 
F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914) ("The court is unable to find any provision in the Constitution 
authorizing Congress, either expressly or by necessary implication, to protect or regulate the 
shooting of migratory wild game when in a state, and is therefore forced to the conclusion 
that the act is unconstitutional."). The Supreme Court, per Justice Holmes, later upheld the 
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that Congress would have attempted a law so expansive as to affect 
farming, timber harvesting, and window installation.49 Congress 
also debated extensively "whether it would be an invasion of pri­
vate property rights to allow federal officials to conduct warrantless 
searches of farms and houses for illegally shot birds."so The regula­
tion of ordinary land use, if intended, would surely have been de­
bated as an invasion of property rights.51 If Congress had intended 
to pass such an expansive law, it seems even more implausible that 
the timber industry and farming groups would have supported it, as 
they did.52 
Congress appeared to treat the MBTA as a hunting statute in 
1960, when it added "market hunter" penalties to the MBTA53 to 
distinguish for-profit hunters from recreational hunters.54 The ad­
ded provisions focused on the sale of birds and bird parts.55 Had 
Congress intended the law to extend further, the amendments 
would have discussed other categories of violators and the penalties 
appropriate to those categories. 
Congress passed up a similar opportunity to expand the scope of 
the MBTA when it amended the MBTA in 1974, one year after 
passing the Endangered Species Act, which contains an expansive 
definition of "take."56 It would have been a logical time to expand 
the MBTA's scope, but Congress did not do so.5 7 Despite consis­
tent judicial application of the MBTA to hunting alone, the 1974 
amendment contained none of the expansive language of the ESA. 
By forbidding the sale of illicitly obtained bird parts, the amend­
ment reinforced the idea that the MBTA concerns itself with activ-
constitutionality of the MBTA. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) ("We see 
nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut 
off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed."). 
49. See Tnnber Appellees' Brief, supra note 10, at 28 n.8 (citing cases cited supra note 
48). 
50. Id. at 30 (citing 56 CONG. REc. 7356-81, 7440-62, 7472-76 (1918)). 
51. See id. 
52. See 56 CoNG. REc. 7357-58. 
53. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act Amendment of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-732, 74 Stat. 866 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 707 (1994)). 
54. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1580 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
55. See 74 Stat. at 866. 
56. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994); see also supra text accom­
panying notes 24-27. 
57. See Migratory Bird Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-300, 88 Stat. 190 (codi­
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 703). Cf. Merrill Lynch v. JJ. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 391 n.92 
(1982) (concluding that Congress presumably agrees with the longstanding judicial interpre­
tation of a term in a statute when it subsequently amends the statute without clarification of 
the term) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 55 n.4 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissent­
ing)); Perkins, supra note 2, at 851 (arguing, perhaps inconsistently, both that the MBTA 
should be construed broadly and that legislative change is necessary to effectuate such an 
interpretation). 
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ity directed at wildlife.58 The 1974 amendment strongly suggests 
that the MBTA is a hunting statute, because no one would worry 
about profits derived from the inadvertent killing of birds.59 
The fairest reading of the MBTA limits its application to activity 
directed at migratory birds. Tb.at the MBTA prohibits pursuing, 
hunting, capturing, and the like strongly suggests that Congress in­
tended to restrict only activity directed at migratory birds. By their 
own lights, and in the context of the rest of the statutory language, 
"take" and "kill" also seem to focus upon purposive conduct. The 
legislative history reinforces that understanding.60 Moreover, ex­
panding the MBTA to encompass activity not intended to cause 
bird deaths would create a criminal law with no satisfactory limit. 
!I. THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF LIMITS ON THE EXP ANDED 
VERSION OF THE MBTA 
Reading the MBTA to prohibit all activity that causes the death 
of migratory birds would make the MBTA an uncontrollably ex­
pansive criminal law. Such an interpretation would lead to ridicu­
lous consequences: "Certainly construction that would bring every 
killing within the statute, such as deaths caused by automobiles, air­
planes, plate glass modem office buildings or picture windows in 
residential dwellings into which birds fly, would offend reason and 
common sense."61 If "take" and "kill" include incidental bird 
deaths, all of those examples fall within the literal scope of "by any 
means or in any manner." In some situations, "the MBTA would 
impose criminal liability on a person for the death of a bird under 
circumstances where no criminal liability would be imposed for 
even the death of another person. "62 
Tb.at result seems so counter-intuitive that one cannot help but 
think there must be some way to read the law broadly without en-
58. See 88 Stat. at 190. 
59. See Mahler, 921 F. Supp. at 1580 ("This language prohibiting use of secondary prod­
ucts derived from migratory birds again reflects an intent to prohibit activity that is intended 
to kill or capture birds. There is again no indication that Congress intended to reach activi­
ties not even intended to kill or capture birds. "). 
60. See, e.g., 56 CoNG. REc. 7374-77 (1918) (debating vociferously which states' hunters 
would benefit from the MBTA). See also 56 CoNG. REc. 7360 (statement of Sen. Anthony) 
("[T]o my knowledge, for the most part, the people who are against this bill are the market 
shooters, who want to go out and kill a lot of birds in the spring, when they ought not to kill 
them . . . .  "). For the argument that modem guns require more stringent hunting controls, 
see 56 CoNG. REc. at 7370 (statement of Sen. Raker) ("The improvement of guns ha[s] been 
such that [game birds] can be reached in all places, and they are slaughtered promiscuously, 
many of them for the market and shipped away, but many are destroyed just simply for the 
fun of shooting. "). 
61. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978). 
62. Mahler, 921 F. Supp. at 1578. For example, an otherwise law-abiding motorist would 
violate the broad version of the MBTA if a bird flew into the car's windshield, yet the motor­
ist would not violate any law if a pedestrian stepped in the way of the car at the last second. 
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compassing such oddities. The proponents of a broad reading of 
the MBTA offer the following limitations to avoid overbreadth: lia­
bility restricted by prosecutorial discretion;63 liability limited to the 
use of extra-hazardous materials;64 and liability only for violations 
of permitting requirements.6s 
Section II.A argues that prosecutorial discretion is not a satis­
factory solution to a vastly overbroad criminal law because it ren­
ders enforcement unpredictable, and because it does not substitute 
for rational interpretation. Section II.B dismisses the extra-hazard­
ous materials rationale relied on by two courts as a standard wholly 
absent from the MBTA, its accompanying regulations, and the leg­
islative history. Section II.C contends that it would be administra­
tively impossible to create a national permitting program sufficient 
to cover every conceivable means by which birds might die as a 
result of human activity. 
A. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Courts that have expanded the reach of the MBTA,66 and schol­
ars who advocate such expansion,6 7 suggest prosecutorial discretion 
63. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905; Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 
1996), revd. on other grounds, 110 F.3d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Corbin 
Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536-37 (E.D. Cal. 1978), affd. , 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). 
64. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 907; Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 553. 
65. See Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 16-17. One might also argue that the 
principle of proximate cause provides the needed limit to a broad interpretation of the 
MBTA. For a good discussion of proximate cause, see generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 46 at 273-74 (5th ed. 1984). Although 
proponents of an expanded MBTA have not advanced this argument, the Supreme Court 
suggested proximate cause as a limiting principle in the context of the ESA. See Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U. S. 687, 696 n.9, 700 n.13 (1995). 
At first blush proximate cause may seem plausible as a limiting principle, but, in fact, it would 
not prevent the criminalization of all or nearly all of the ordinary land use activity that a 
sensible interpretation of the MBTA would exclude. Installing a picture window, for exam­
ple, directly and foreseeably causes the death of birds. Unless the window itself operates as 
an intervening cause, the harm to the bird follows directly from the mounting of the window. 
Anyone installing windows is aware, or should be aware, of the possibility (if not likelihood) 
of bird casualties. Similarly, chopping down trees directly and foreseeably causes the death 
of birds; proximate cause would be reduced to absurdity if it required that the chainsaw itself 
make contact with the bird. If proximate cause is used more loosely, as little more than an ad 
hoc judgment made by the trier of fact as to the culpability of the defendant, then it begins to 
look more like judicial discretion. Cf. KEETON ET AL., supra, at 274 ("[P]redicting outcomes 
in pending cases is hazardous indeed if one looks only to theories."). For an argument that 
prosecutorial discretion does not provide a satisfactory limit to the MBTA, see infra section 
II.A. 
66. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905-08; Sierra Club, 933 F. Supp. at 1564-65; Corbin Farm 
Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 529, 531-36. 
67. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2; Scott Fmet, Habitat Protection and the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act, 10 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1996); Sjostrom, supra note 2. 
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as a limiting principle.68 While it admittedly seems unlikely that a 
prosecutor would try a case involving a sparrow flying into some­
one's kitchen window - though a woman was recently prosecuted 
under the MBTA for giving First Lady Hillary Clinton a "dream 
catcher" made with bird feathers69 - there are serious practical 
and theoretical problems with relying on prosecutorial discretion. 
Discretion in enforcing the lvIBTA would not be predictable. 
Enforcement policies might vary from administration to administra­
tion in dramatic ways, making long-range land use planning much 
more difficult. 70 People are generally risk averse and will avoid the 
possibility of criminal prosecution by curtailing otherwise desirable 
behavior. We could run the risk of deterring land use that is impor­
tant for food production and timber supply. 71 
Perhaps some environmentalists would welcome the unpredict­
ability of prosecutorial discretion, because it would avoid the 
problems caused by individuals who stay within the technical 
boundaries of a law while doing their best to violate its spirit. 72 On 
the other hand, the fuzzy boundary of the lvIBTA would be excep­
tionally broad. The potential scope of the MBTA has already 
caused apprehension. 73 
68. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905 (stating that where conviction "would offend 
reason and co=on sense," resolution through nominal penalties "can be left to the sound 
discretion of prosecutors and the courts"). 
69. See Alan McConagha, Hillary's Feathered Gift Gets Plucked: 'Dream Catcher' is a 
Nightmare, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at A3; They Swooped, THE EcoNOMIST, Aug. 19, 
1995, at 27 ("If you are the sort of American who believes the federal government is bird­
brained, here is apparent proof. Peg Bargon, a middle-aged wife and mother in rural Monti­
cello, Illinois, faces the possibility of a year in jail and a fine of $156,000 because of an eagle 
feather."). 
70. For an in-depth discussion of the problems associated with prosecutorial discretion, 
see KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, POLICE 
DISCRETION (1975); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 
AM. J. CoMP. L. 532 (1970). 
71. This would be especially ironic because in 1918 Congress thought it was passing a law 
that would aid the war effort by spurring just such productive land use. See supra text accom­
panying notes 42-47. 
72. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HAR.v. 
L. REv. 22, 63 (1992) (arguing "that bright-line rules allow the 'bad man' to engage in socially 
unproductive behavior right up to the line; on a pessimistic view of human nature, the chilling 
effect of standards can be a good thing"). 
73. See, e.g., Farley, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ARMY LAw., Dec. 1996, at 29. 
Prosecutorial discretion would not be a limiting factor at all if environmental groups had 
either a private right of action to enforce the MBTA against private parties or an Administra­
tive Procedure Act action to enforce the MBTA against federal agencies. Although no ap­
pellate court has yet allowed a MBTA claim by a private party to proceed against the 
government, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1554-55 (11th Cir. 1997), the issue 
remains unresolved in most circuits. Moreover, the courts have not considered whether a 
private party could sue another private party. As the United States Forest Service bas ex­
plained, "This approach could effectively require that the National Forests be managed pre­
dominately as migratory bird reserves even though Congress has directed the Forest Service 
to manage the National Forests for multiple uses including timber harvest, mining and graz­
ing." Brief for Federal Appellees at 30, Newton County Wrldlife Assn. v. United States For-
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As a matter of jurisprudence, discretion is not satisfactory be­
cause it avoids the question of statutory interpretation: the ques­
tion of what the law is in the first place.74 To the extent that the 
proponents of a broad interpretation of the MBTA rely on discre­
tion, they demonstrate an inability to articulate a theoretical limit 
to potential liability under the MBTA and turn to common sense as 
a solution.75 Prosecutorial discretion becomes the means for sal­
vaging an over-broad law. 
Prosecutorial discretion is also less than ideal because not every 
prosecutor can be counted on to show adequate discretion.76 This 
problem may be acute in a pro-environment climate where, "[e]ach 
year the Department of Justice announces 'record levels' of fines 
imposed, persons indicted, and jail time served for infractions of 
environmental regulations." 77 A prosecutor with political ambi­
tions, not unheard of, "might allow public opinion and potential 
media coverage" to influence the exercise of discretion.78 
B. Extra-hazardous Materials 
The MBTA could also be interpreted to reach beyond conduct 
directed at birds only when extra-hazardous materials are involved. 
The extra-hazardous materials extension has some appeal in that it 
is the only expansive interpretation of the MBTA relied upon by 
the courts. In United States v. FMC Corp., the Second Circuit found 
criminal liability where a defendant allowed toxins to seep into a 
pond causing bird death. According to the court: "[S]trict liability 
has been deemed to apply . . . when a person engages in ex­
trahazardous activities .... The principle here is the same as in the 
est Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1035 {1998) {No. 96-3463) 
[hereinafter Brief for Federal Appellees]. 
74 .. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1582 { S.D. Ind. 1996) 
("[T]rust in prosecutorial discretion is not really an answer to the issue of statutory 
construction."). 
75. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 191 (arguing that the MBTA should be con­
strued broadly, but nonetheless conceding that "it is questionable as a jurisprudential matter 
whether the problem [of finding a limit to the law] should be begged simply by reference to 
prosecutorial discretion"). 
76. See Gregory A. Zafiris, Co=ent, Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Ore­
gon Environmental Crimes Act: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 24 ENVTL. L. 1673, 1674 
{1994) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion "is susceptible to both abuse and error under 
normal circumstances, and environmental law by its nature further increases the likelihood of 
misuse"). Prosecutors may abuse their discretion by using a vague law "to force an unfair 
plea bargain upon defendants who barely fit the technical requirements of that law." Id. at 
1681. Elected prosecutors may also succumb to public pressure in high profile environmental 
cases. See id. at 1682 ("Pressure from constituents could coerce locally elected district attor­
neys into charging local industries for technical violations that would be better handled 
administratively."). 
77. Trmothy Lynch, Polluting our Principles: Environmental Prosecutions and the Bill of 
Rights, 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 161, 161 {1996). 
78. Id. at 170. 
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tort situation . . . .  "79 In United States v. Corbin Farm Services, a 
district court held that the defendant could be liable under the 
MBTA for the misapplication of pesticides that resulted in bird 
death.80 
The quasi-tort theory of the extra-hazardous materials limit 
seems curiously out of place in the context of the MBTA. Nowhere 
does the MBTA or its legislative history mention extra-hazardous 
materials.81 Both FMC and Corbin have been distinguished in sub­
sequent MBTA litigation on the grounds that they constituted an 
exception to the normal operation of the MBTA - a gentle way of 
dispensing with a quasi-tort principle that finds no support in the 
law.82 
An extra-hazardous materials limit would, in any event, be un­
satisfactory to many supporters of a broad MBTA, because they 
seek to use FMC and Corbin as the precedential underpinnings of 
an expanded MBTA and not as a relatively narrow exception to it.83 
The extra-hazardous materials limit, then, has a double disadvan­
tage: it is both inconsistent with any plausible interpretation of the 
MBTA as enacted and ineffective as judicial legislation. 
C. Permits 
Some advocates of a broad interpretation of the MBTA might 
argue that the MBTA does not require the unreasonable result of 
banning all land use activity, but only makes the reasonable de­
mand that such activity first be permitted by the Fish and Wildlife 
Service. Permitting is not a reasonable solution for two reasons: 1) 
no such permitting scheme is currently available; and 2) even if 
available, such a scheme would have to be nationwide and incredi­
bly intrusive in order to cover everything from farming to installing 
picture windows. It is hard to imagine what benefit such an admin­
istratively unworkable permit system would be to migratory birds. 
79. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 907 (2d Cir. 1978). 
80. See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536 (E.D. Cal. 1978), affd., 
578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). 
81. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1583 n.9 (S.D. Ind. 1996) 
(dismissing the extra-hazardous materials limit as having "no apparent basis in the statute 
itself or in the prior history of the MBTA's application since its enactment"). None of this is 
to suggest that the indiscriminate use of pesticides is beyond the reach of the law. "The 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act . . .  would protect birds if only it were 
P.nforced . . . .  " Ted Williams, Silent Scourge: Legally-Used Pesticides are Killing Tens of 
Millions of America's Birds, AUDUBON, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 28, 35. 
82. See, e.g., Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1576-83, 1583 n.9. 
83. None of the recent lawsuits against the timber industry, for example, would have 
been viable under a theory of extra-hazardous materials. See Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1583, 
n.9 (stating that the extra-hazardous materials limit "would not support application of the 
MBTA's prohibitions to logging activities"). 
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The statute requires that every activity that falls within the am­
bit of "take" and "kill" must receive a permit,84 regardless of the 
ease or complexity of the permitting process, but no such permit 
exists for incidental bird death. The general permit provision in the 
regulations essentially restates the language of the MBTA: 
No person shall take, possess, import, export, transport, sell, 
purchase, barter, or offer for sale, purchase or barter, any migratory 
bird . . .  except as may be permitted under the terms of a valid permit 
issued pursuant to the provisions of this part . . . .  8s 
Beyond that vague framework, no mechanism exists for permit­
ting general land use activity. Nor do any of the special permit pro­
visions cover land use activity that might indirectly cause the death 
of migratory birds.86 That the specific permits only include activi­
ties directed at wildlife suggests further that no one intended to 
make incidental bird death a criminal violation. 
Only a general permit could include every means or manner of 
bringing about the untimely demise of migratory birds, because 
processing millions of individual permit applications would be ad­
ministratively infeasible. The current general permit contains a 
provision for state game departments that requires "accurate 
records of . . . the species and numbers of birds acquired. "87 The 
new general permits, whatever they looked like, probably could not 
realistically include such a requirement. For example, an airline pi­
lot is unlikely to know how many birds fly into the engines, and 
highly unlikely to be able to identify them by species. All the cur­
rent special permits in the MBTA require such accounting, and, as 
one court observed: "The detailed reporting requirements show 
that the regulations for exceptions are not compatible with logging 
operations or other activities that may unintentionally destroy some 
nests and cause the deaths of some birds."88 
84. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994) ("Unless and except as permitted by regulations . . .  it shall 
be unlawful . . .  to pursue, hunt, take . . . .  "). 
85. Migratory Bird Permits, 50 C.F.R. § 21.11 {1997). 
86. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 21.21 {import and export permits); 50 C.F.R. § 21.22 {banding or 
marking permits); 50 C.F.R. § 21.23 (scientific collecting permits); 50 C.F.R. § 21.24 (taxider­
mist permits). No permits for activity such as timber harvesting, farming, or flying planes are 
available under the MBTA's regulatory scheme. 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 allows for additional spe­
cial purpose permits but imposes substantial requirements, including maintenance of detailed 
records of all birds acquired under the permits, that make it unsuitable as a means of issuing 
general permits to cover bird death. On private land, prohibiting productive land use with­
out compensation might even violate the "Takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment. See 
generally 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JoHN E. NoWAK, TREATISE ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.12 n.39 {2d ed. 1992). 
87. 50 C.F.R. § 21.12. 
88. Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1582 n.6. Creating a new permit program would also require 
following the Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-co=ent rulemaking procedures, 
see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994), and could take two or three years. In the meantime everything that 
falls within the scope of a broadened MBTA would be transitionally illegal. Perhaps some 
December 1998] Migratory Bird Treaty Act 839 
A scheme that could include and somehow regulate everything 
from yardwork to flying an airplane during the fall migration is 
unimaginable. Yet, if the MBTA included incidental migratory bird 
deaths, such a permit scheme would somehow have to be created. 
Fortunately, such a reading of the MBTA is counter to its plain text 
and legislative history. 
* * *  
Once interpreted broadly, the MBTA does not admit of limits. 
Prosecutorial discretion is both theoretically unsatisfying and prac­
tically unreliable - as the woman prosecuted for giving Hillary 
Clinton a "dream catcher" made from bird feathers would readily 
testify. Nothing in the text of the statute suggests extra-hazardous 
materials as a limit. Finally, the MBTA's permit requirement would 
be overwhelmed if asked to cover every conceivable type of land 
use activity and every citizen engaged in such activity. Instead of 
looking to an expanded MBTA, environmentalists should rely on 
existing environmental land use regulations. 
III. MORE RECENT ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
In the 80 years since the MBTA, Congress has passed a multi­
tude of environmental laws.89 This Part asserts that the MBTA 
does not stand alone and argues that the current environmental 
framework is more than adequate to protect migratory birds. The 
newer laws reflect a more contemporary understanding of ecosys­
tems - for example, the importance of habitat90 - and work to­
gether to balance the use and preservation of the environment. The 
MBTA, narrowly interpreted, provides an important part of the en­
vironmental framework by requiring permits for activity intended 
to cause the death of migratory birds. This Part contends that a 
broadly interpreted MBTA, however, would conflict with the land 
use planning contemplated by other environmental laws. 
The Migratory Bird Conservation Act (MBCA), passed a dec­
ade after the MBTA, is the MBTA's closest relation and shares the 
"Protection of Migratory Game and Insectivorous Birds" chapter of 
the United States Code.91 As one court explained: "Together, the 
Treaty Act - in regulating hunting and possession - and the Con­
servation Act - by establishing sanctuaries and preserving natural 
exception could be crafted to avoid the temporary illegality, but it is unclear what a final 
permit program would look like. 
89. See, e.g., Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715 (1994); Endangered Spe­
cies Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); North American Wetlands Conservation Act, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 4401-4414 (seeking to "protect, enhance, restore and manage . . .  wetland ecosys­
tems and other habitats for migratory birds"). 
90. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (defining "critical habitat"). 
91. 16 u.s.c. § 715 (1994). 
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waterfowl habitat - help implement our national commitment to 
the protection of migratory birds."92 The MBCA authorizes the 
Secretary of the Interior to purchase land and water,93 provided 
"that such [habitat] is necessary for the conservation of migratory 
birds."94 Such purchases arguably would never become necessary if 
landowners had to maintain their lands so as never to cause the 
death of migratory birds. Thus, a broad interpretation of the 
MBTA would in effect import much of the habitat preservation of 
the MBCA into the MBTA, rendering unnecessary the compensa­
tion allowances.9s 
On National Forest System lands, comprising over 191 million 
acres,96 the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 196097 (MUSYA), 
the National Forest Management Act of 197698 (NFMA), and im­
plementing regulations provide protection for migratory birds. In 
MUSYA, Congress declared the policy "that the national forests 
are established . . .  for outdoor recreation, range, timber, water­
shed, and wildlife and fish purposes. "99 The NFMA gives substance 
to that policy by requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to assure 
that development plans accommodate multiple usesioo and "pro­
vide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the 
suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet 
overall multiple-use objectives . . . .  "101 The MBTA does not pro­
vide for a balancing of competing uses and, broadly construed, 
would impede the purpose of the MUSYA and NFMA. Under a 
broadened MBTA, the Forest Service could not, for example, de­
cide that the loss of some grackles was outweighed by the benefit of 
a certain amount of timber harvesting.102 
92. United States v. North Dakota, 650 F.2d 911, 913-14 (8th Cir. 1981), affd., North 
Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983). 
93. See 16 U.S.C. § 715a; 16 U.S.C. § 715d. 
94. 16 U.S.C. § 715c. 
95. But cf. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 
702-03 (1995) (rejecting a similar argument in the context of the BSA). 
96. See USDA Forest Service, Land Areas of the National Forest System (visited Nov. 11, 
1998) <http://www.fs.fed.us/database/lar/lartabl.htm>. 
97. 16 u.s.c. §§ 528-531. 
98. 16 u.s.c. § 1600 (1994). 
99. 16 u.s.c. § 528. 
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(l). 
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). See also 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1998) ("[W]ildlife habitat 
shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native 
vertebrate species in the planning area."); James A Siemans, Comment, A "Hard Look" at 
Biodiversity and the National Forest Management Act, 6 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 177 (1992) 
(identifying problems in the implementation of the NFMA, but concluding that "[w]ere 
NFMA implemented faithfully, the national and global decline in biodiversity would be sig­
nificantly redressed"). 
102. Although the Endangered Species Act also prohibits balancing, it limits such strict 
protection to wildlife in imminent danger of extinction. The META, if broadly interpreted, 
December 1998] Migratory Bird Treaty Act 841 
Ironically, an absolute ban on activity that destroyed any bird 
might prevent activity beneficial to birds in the aggregate. As the 
government argued in its brief to the Eighth Circuit, the timber har­
vesting there at issue would "enhance diversity of migratory birds 
by providing needed habitat for early successional species, includ­
ing migratory birds like the white-eyed vireo and yellow breasted 
chat, while, at the same time, providing for the needs of migratory 
birds that need more mature forest, such as the ovenbird and scarlet 
tanager."103 The Ruffed Grouse also thrives in the brush land 
which grows in after a clearcut.104 
The Endangered Species Act heightens the level of protection 
afforded to creatures in danger of extinction. As discussed,105 its 
definition of "take" does include activities that "harm" or "harass" 
a listed species.106 Extending such stringent protection to all migra­
tory birds would conflict with the idea of balancing multiple uses 
endorsed by Congress in the MUSYA and would render the ESA 
duplicative (at least with regard to migratory birds). Such a change 
in the law should be created by a new statute, not the reinterpreta­
tion of an old one. 
Many of the migratory birds covered by the MBTA are thriving 
and, therefore, do not need stringent protection. One might argue 
that we should not wait until a species is endangered before we 
protect it,107 but environmental regulation is not all-or-nothing. 
The issue is not whether we should provide any protection to migra­
tory birds. Rather, the question is whether we should allow the 
public interest in migratory birds to supersede our interest in pro­
ductive land use. 
CONCLUSION 
The MBTA's plain meaning and legislative history require a re­
strained interpretation. If interpreted broadly, the MBTA would 
resist principled limitation; prosecutorial discretion, extra-hazard­
ous materials, and permit schemes all fail to provide a meaningful 
limit. Moreover, the fate of migratory birds does not depend upon 
such a strained interpretation of the MBTA. More recently minted 
would give the maximum level of protection to virtually every bird. The granting of permits 
might ameliorate the problem to some extent, but, as explained supra section II.C, would 
first require the difficult task of expanding the permitting system to include general permits 
for activity not directed against wildlife. 
103. Brief for Federal Appellees, supra note 73 at 9. 
104. See Ruffed Grouse Habitat (visited Nov. 14, 1998) <http://www.vermontel.com/ 
-epgorge/habitat.htm>. The ruffed grouse is one of North America's most popular game 
birds; it is not, however, protected by the MBTA. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1997). 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27. 
106. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994). 
107. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 206; Perkins, supra note 2, at 820. 
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environmental laws protect wildlife and seek to achieve a balance 
of various kinds of land use. 
When the :MBTA is construed sensibly, as a whole and in light 
of legislative history, it can be read only to criminalize activity di­
rected against migratory birds. 
